
























zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study 
of Labor 
Network Formations among Immigrants and Natives
IZA DP No. 4234
June 2009
Gil S. Epstein
Odelia Heizler (Cohen) 
Network Formations among 




Gil S. Epstein 
Bar-Ilan University, CReAM 
and IZA  
 
Odelia Heizler (Cohen) 













P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  







Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in 
this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of 
Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and 
conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) 
original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of 
policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 











Network Formations among Immigrants and Natives 
 
In this paper we examine possible network formations among immigrants and natives with 
endogenous investment. We consider a model of a network formation where the initiator of 
the link bears its cost while both agents benefit from it. We present the model by considering 
possible interactions between immigrants and the new society in the host country: 
assimilation, separation, integration and marginalization. The paper highlights different 
aspects of immigrants’ behavior and their interaction with the members of the host country 
(society) and their source country (society). We found that when the stock of the immigrants 
in the host country increases, the immigrants’ investment in the middlemen increases and the 
natives may bear the cost of link formation with the middlemen. 
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1. Introduction 
Consider a new immigrant in an unfamiliar environment. The migrant does not know 
the foreign location, the local language and the customs of the host society. The 
migrant needs assistance in order to become familiar with the new environment and to 
find accommodation and a job. If in the host country there are migrants from the same 
origin, who arrived earlier in time, they will most probably be able to provide the new 
migrant ethnic networks, i.e. the necessary help in order to assimilate in the new 
location. The existence of this network has a great effect on the immigrants’ choice of 
location. 
  Numerous studies have demonstrated that immigrants tend to settle in ethnic 
concentrations (see, for instance, Church and King, 1983; Bartel, 1989; Borjas, 1998). 
Once the first immigrant settles in a certain location, future immigrants are no longer 
indifferent about destinations. As the stock of immigrants increases, the cost of 
subsequent immigrants decreases (see Massey, 1987 and Carrington et al., 1996). This 
is because previous immigrants provide the new immigrant with social support, job-
search assistance, help in finding accommodations and information on the alien 
environment and the local culture. Battu et al. (2004) shows theoretically and 
empirically that less assimilated ethnic unemployed workers are more likely to use 
their friends and family as their main method of search. However, they have less 
chance of finding a job using this method than whites and more assimilated ethnic 
unemployed workers who use formal job search methods (such as: advertisements, 
employment agencies, responding to newspaper advertisements, etc.). 
              In  addition  to  the  job-search assistance, the immigrants’ concentration 
provides the settlers with “ethnic goods”, the products and services which the 
immigrants do not share with the host population (e.g., saris, Chinese vegetables, 
kosher food, churches, mosques, temples, or synagogues). The cost of “ethnic goods” 
decreases with the number of immigrants who settle in the enclave and all the 
immigrants, old and new, benefit from the increase in its size (see Chiswick and 
Miller, 2005).                                                                                                                                                  
Residence in ethnic concentrations facilitates, at first, the assimilation process. 
However, studies show that it may have a negative effect on the success of 
adjustment. For example, Culter and Gleaser (1997) found that blacks who are located 
in more segregated areas have significantly worse success than blacks in less 
segregated areas. Borjas (2000) found that ethnic residential segregation hampers the   3
process of economic assimilation. The reason for this negative effect on the 
assimilation process is that an increase in the immigrants' stock in the enclaves 
increases the competition for jobs and decreases the immigrants’ wages (see Bauer 
Epstein and Gang, 2005; 2007). Furthermore, these enclaves create incentives for the 
immigrants not to learn the culture and language of the host country. A destination 
language deficiency reduces the income and harms assimilation (Chiswick 1978; 
Chiswick and Miller, 1996). Moreover, the existence of an ethnic enclave may cause 
xenophobia (Dustmann and Preston, 2000). Joining the local society requires the 
immigrant to invest effort and resources such as investment in learning the local 
language and customs.   
The residence of an immigrant in a segregated area affects the interaction with 
the dominant (local) society. Berry (1997) points to four possible models for 
interaction between the immigrants and the new society. Assimilation takes place 
when individuals break away from their cultural identity and seek daily interaction 
with the native culture. The immigrants are then assimilated in the host society and 
resemble the natives. Separation occurs when individuals place a value on retaining 
their original culture and wish to avoid interaction with the local culture. Integration 
occurs when the individuals are interested in maintaining the original culture in their 
daily interaction, in parallel with an attempt to become full participants in the new 
society. Marginalization occurs when the individuals fail to maintain interaction with 
both their original and local society thus pushing them to society’s margins.
1 
In this paper we set out a formal framework of possible network formations 
within the society and among different societies: natives and immigrants. One of the 
first decisions of the immigrant is with whom to maintain a link in the foreign 
country. In our model, the individual decides not only with regard to how many 
people he wishes to maintain a link and their identity (immigrants or natives), but also 
how much effort he invests in these links. Furthermore, we examined the possible 
interactions between the immigrants and the local society: assimilation, separation 
and integration.  
                                                 
1 Recently, Echenique and Fryer (2007) presented a framework to measure the segregation between 
different groups. The analysis is based on social interactions of the members of a race. 
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This study contributes to the existing literature in two distinct ways. Firstly, 
most of the existing literature assumes exogenous investment in the friendship link 
and homogenous agents, whereas in our model the investment in the friendship link is 
endogenous while we consider two different types of groups and secondly, we 
implement this model with regard to migration and present possible interactions 
between the immigrants and the new society. 
The paper proceeds as follows: A background on network formation and a 
model of endogenous investment in friendship are presented in the next section. 
Implementation of this model to migration is presented in section 3. Section 4 
contains concluding remarks. 
 
2. The model 
2.1 Background  
There is a well-established and vast literature in economics and sociology on the role 
played by social networks in communicating valuable information. This information 
may include, among other things, job and accommodation options, business 
opportunities, stock market tips and the quality of products. For example, 
Montgomery (1991) presents a long list of research on the important role of social 
ties, such as friends and relatives, in job search outcomes. However, only few studies 
emphasize the role of social ties in job searches among minorities (see, for example, 
Holzer, 1987). 
Social relationships come in many shapes and sizes, and there is no single 
model which encompasses them all together. Let us depict the main categories and 
characteristics of network formation in recent literature (for a comprehensive review 
see Jackson, 2003). Most of the existing network models of formation fall into one of 
two approaches: non-directed network and directed network. The former category 
takes place when two players are either connected or not and it is impossible that one 
is related to the second without the second being related to the first. The latter 
category occurs when one player may be connected to a second without the second 
being connected to the first. 
Another characteristic of networks is who incurs the cost of link formation. In 
the majority of the studies both agents bear the cost for link formation, whereas in 
others the costs are borne only by the person who initiates the link (see Bala and 
Goyal, 2000a; 2000b). The literature on social networks focuses on stable and   5
efficient networks and the relationship between these networks. For example Jackson 
and Wolinsky (1996) provide sufficient conditions for efficiency of different types of 
structures.  The conditions are in terms of the cost and benefit of the link and the fact 
that the link requires the consent of both parties involved, but severance can be done 
unilaterally. Kim and Wong (2007) examine stability where single agent’s unilateral 
action is limited in affecting the network structure. 
Most of the existing literature assumes that the agents are homogenous and the 
investment in the link formation is constant. However, there is an emerging literature 
which proposes a different approach to network formation. Goyal and Moraga 
Gonzales (2001) present a two-stage model where firms first establish links and then 
decide on their R&D investment in every bilateral relationship. Brueckner (2006) 
considers a stochastic model of social networks where the level of investment in link 
formation is endogenous and the formation of a link between two agents requires a 
two-sided investment. Bloch and Dutta (2008) presents a model with an endogenous 
cost of the link formation focusing on two polar cases of agents’ investments: perfect 
substitutes and perfect complements. They find that when the investments are perfect 
substitutes, the most efficient network is the symmetric star network, whereas when 
the investments are perfect complements, the symmetric line and cycle networks are 
both efficient and stable. Haller and Sarangi (2006) also develop a model of social 
network which enables different probabilities for different links basing on Bala and 
Goyal (2000b). Galeotti et al. (2006) present a model of network formation with 
heterogeneous players in respect to their benefits, as well as to the costs of forming 
links. They also deal with link formation using an insider–outsider models where the 
society is composed of distinct groups. Finally, Currarini et al. (2007) study a 
matching process of friendship-formation showing that the groups' sizes determine 
equilibrium outcome.  
 
2.2 Endogenous investment in friendship 
We consider a finite set of homogenous agents  { } 1,2,... ,..., Ni n = , where one 
individual joins the group each period. The group may be a religious group, a 
minority, political, sports, school fraternity, youth group, etc. The new individual, 
iN ∈ , has to decide how many and to what intensity he wishes to maintain his links. 
Decisions are made sequentially with people joining the group. Information is   6
assumed to be complete, i.e. when a new agent joins the group he is aware of the links 
between the members of the group and thus his decision is based on this common 
knowledge. Each period, after the new individual has joined, all other individuals can 
update their decision by adding links, severing links or investing more or less efforts 
in the existent links. 
We follow Watts (2001; 2002) and Jackson and Watts (2002) and consider 
myopic behavior, i.e. individuals do not forecast how their decision to add or sever a 
link could affect future decisions of others. As stated by these authors, such myopic 
behavior is a natural behavior in the context of large networks. In addition, the agents 
have limited information about the number of future agents who may or could join the 
group.  For example, a member of a minority group doesn’t know when the flow of 
immigrants to the destination country will cease, due to a reform in migration policy 
etc. Furthermore, Jackson (2003) presents a literature review of experiments that 
compare myopic versus forward-looking behavior in networks. He states that there is 
little evidence of forward-looking behavior even in environments designed to elicit it.  
Following Bala and Goyal (2002a, 2002b), we present a non-cooperative 
model of network formation, assuming that the costs of link formation are incurred 
only by the agent who initiates the link, even though both agents benefit from the 
friendship. Hence, if one individual connects to another agent, he will bear the linking 
cost. 
2 Contrary to most of the existing literature, which assumes that the investment is 
a binary action (i.e., to form a link or not) and the cost is constant, we examine the 
scenario where investment is a continuous variable and is determined endogenously.  
Denote the benefit from a friendship link by u  and the effort which is invested 
in agent number  j  by agent number i by  , ij e . The intensity (or the strength) of the 
relationship between i and  j ,  , () ij p e , depends on the investment in the relationship 










                                                 
2 Note that while a link is created between two agents both agents bear a cost, but one agent incurs the 
main cost or the additional cost of maintaining the link. For example, if one individual hosts or phones 


























 (see figure 1).
3 For example, 
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 (see figure 2 for an illustration).  
We assume that if there are several paths between two agents, the agents can 
only benefit from one of the paths, and the agents will choose to connect through the 
path with the highest intensity (which is not necessarily the shortest path). 
Let us define the main structures of social networks: a network is empty if it 
contains no links, and is complete if a link between every pair of agents exists (see 
figure 3). Another prominent network structure is a star network, under which all 
players are linked to one central player and there are no other links (see figure 4). 
Denote the optimal effort which the second individual invests in the first 
individual by 
*
2,1 e . The second individual forms a link with the first immigrant if, and 
only if, his benefit is positive, i.e.: 
(1)  ( )
**
22 , 1 2 , 1 0 Bp e u e = −>  
 
If equation (1) is not valid then an empty network is obtained. Let us now consider 
different structures of network formations assuming that equation (1) is satisfied. 
Denote the effort in a star network by e
s and the central agent by 1.  In period N  the 
utility of individual  3 ii ∀≥ in a “star network” would be: 
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The optimal effort of individual i which is invested in the relationship in the central 
agent satisfies: 
 
                                                 

















































                              
Proposition 1: 
In the formation of a “star network”, the intensity of the relationships of the agents 
with the central agent increases every period.  
 
Proof: See Appendix 1. 
 
Lemma 1: If the second and the third individuals form a link with the same individual 
but not with each other, then all the future agents who arrive will invest in the same 
individual and a “star network” will be created. 
 
Proof: See Appendix 2. 
 
In “complete network” each agent forms links with all the previous agents. Thus at 
period  N  agent i benefits from  1 N −  direct links, but he maintains the link only with 
the  1 i−  previous agents. All the agents are identical, hence the agent invests the same 
effort in them, i.e.  ,1 ,2 , 1 ...
cc c
ii i i ee e − == =  (c denotes “complete network”).  
The utility of individual i is thus given by: 
 
(4)  ,1 ,1 (1 ) ( () )
cc
ii i B ip e u e =− −  
 
 



















As opposed to “star network”, the optimal level of effort in the “complete network”, 
c e , is constant and is independent of the size of the group.  In a “star network” agent 
i derives benefit from one direct link and  2 N −  indirect links via single investment,   9
whereas in a “complete network” the agent benefits from one direct link from each 
investment. It is easy to see from proposition 1 and figure 1 that as the number of the 
members in the group increases, the gap between the investments in the two structures 
increases as well. 
By lemma 1, if the third agent forms a link only with one agent – a “star 
network” is created. Let us assume that the third agent forms a link with the two 
previous agents. The fourth agent faces three possibilities: (a) to form a link only with 
one agent and to benefit from one direct link and two indirect links; (b) to form a link 
with two agents and to benefit from two direct links and one indirect link and (c) to 
form a link with all the agents and to benefit from three direct links. Denote the 
optimal investment of the fourth agent by 
*
4,i e . With the first possibility, the 
investment is highest and is equal to the investment in “star network” which is 
described by (3). In the third possibility the investment equals the investment in 
“complete network”, 
c e . In the second possibility one investment is equal to 
c e  and 




ii ee e < < . The variety of the possibilities for the 
fifth agent increases and we can obtain different structures of networks. 
So far the agents benefit from friends, “friends of friends” and “friends of 
friends of friends” and so forth. It is clear that benefits decrease smoothly as link 
distances increase. We can think of situations where the benefits are zero when more 
than two links are involved (Brueckner, 2006). Let us now examine the network 
formation where the distance between the links is limited to two. 
 
Proposition 2: 
Under the assumption that the distance between the links is limited to 2, three 
possible equilibria exist: 
 1.  A “star network” - all individuals invest only in a central agent, 
2.  A “complete network” - each agent invests in all previous agents,  
3. The possibility of moving from a “complete network” to a “star network”. At the 
beginning everyone invests in all previous agents and from a specific agent all agents 
invest in a single central agent (figure 5). 
 
Proof: See Appendix 3 
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3. Network formation between immigrants and natives 
Suppose now that two sets of individuals join the society at different times, such that 
time gaps exist between them. Let us call the individuals of the first set “natives” and 
the individuals of last set “immigrants”.
4 Since immigrants consume specific ethnic 
goods, we assume that an immigrant can make a link between himself and the natives 
and between other immigrants and the natives. However immigrants cannot create a 
linkage between themselves via natives. The connection must be direct and not via 
natives.  
 
To state matters formally, let 
ML u  -  the utility that an immigrant has from a direct link with a native; 
LM u  - the utility that a native has from a direct link with an immigrant; 
MM u  - the utility that an immigrant has from a direct link with an immigrant; 
Assuming that  MLL M uu > . 
Following Galeotti et al. (2006), we assume that the cost of forming links 
within the groups is lower as compared to the cost of forming links across groups. 
Immigration is a salient example as immigrants, in many cases, speak different 
languages and have different manners than the natives. Hence, if an immigrant wishes 
to form a link with individuals from the another group, there is a fixed cost, c, of 
acquiring the language and knowing their mentality in addition to the variable cost, e. 
As previously, it is assumed that the agent who gains more benefit from the link bears 
the cost of the relationship. 
Following Berry (1997): Assimilation takes place when the immigrant forms 
links with natives but severs links with other immigrants. Separation (or segregation) 
occurs when the immigrant forms links with immigrants but not with natives. 
Integration happens when the immigrant has interaction with both societies: 
immigrants and natives. Marginalization takes place when the immigrant fails to 
maintain interaction with the both societies. 
    Let us now examine the possible network formations between the natives and 
the immigrants. The first immigrant faces two main possibilities either to form a link 
with the natives or not. As shown previously, the natives can be linked as a “star 
                                                 
4 The gap time between the last individual in the first set to the first individual in the last set is 
sufficient for full assimilation.   11
network”, as a “complete network” or as a different structure. Suppose that the first 
immigrant chooses the first possibility and forms a link with the natives. Denote the 
expected benefit of immigrant i from the optimal investments in interactions with the 
natives by 
i M X , immigrant i by  i M , native i by  i L  and the number of natives by L. 
The immigrant benefits from the friendship more than the natives, so he incurs the 













− −> ∑  
 
The second immigrant faces the following possibilities: (a) to form a link only with  
natives; (b) to form a link only with the first immigrant; (c) to form a link with natives 
and the first immigrant; and (d) not to form any links at all. From equation (6) and the 
fact that 










== ∑∑ , it is easy to see that when the first immigrant 
decides to form a link, possibility (d) is not worthwhile for the second immigrant. Let 
us examine the valid possibilities: Suppose that the immigrant chooses the first 
possibility and forms a link only with natives. His choice reveals that his net benefit is 
positive and satisfies: 
 
(7)  ()




M ML M ML MM M M MM
ii
Xe c Xe c p e u e
==
==
−− > −− + − ∑∑  
 
21 , M M e  is the optimal investment of the first immigrant in the second immigrant which 












. The LHS of equation (7) presents the net benefit when 
the immigrant links to natives, whereas the RHS presents the net benefit from linking 
to natives and the first immigrant. From equation (7) it follows that: 
 
(8)  ()
21 21 ,, 0 MM M M MM Pe u e − <  
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This means that the net benefit of an immigrant from the interaction with another 











= =∀ ≥ ∑∑ , all future 
immigrants will form a link with the natives but not with other immigrants and a 
complete assimilation is obtained. Figure 6.1 presents a possible formation of 
assimilation. The immigrants who are assimilated in the destination country adopt the 
language, values and manners of the host society and sever their connection with their 
origin society. This may happen when the social distance between the immigrants and 
the natives is small and the level of prejudice, ethnocentrism, racism and 
discrimination is relatively low. Alternatively it occurs when the immigrants are 
highly skilled and can easily acquire the new language. This result is supported by 
Bauer, Epstein and Gang (2005), who examined the effect of ethic enclaves on the 
location choice of Mexicans in the U.S. They found that immigrants with little 
English proficiency (i.e., their connection cost, c, is high) chose to migrate to 
destinations with large ethnic enclaves and vice versa for immigrants with good 
English proficiency. 
  If the second immigrant chooses possibility (b) and links only with the 
previous immigrant then: 
 
(9)  () ( ) ()





M MM M M M M M M M M M M L M M
i
pe u X e X pe u e c e
=
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M M e  is the investment of the second immigrant in the first immigrant, if he 
forms only a single link and 
21 ,
B
M M e  is the his investment in the first immigrant, this is 
in addition to links with the natives. As shown above, 
12 1 1 2 ,, ,
jj
AA




MM MM ee k j ≥∀ ≠ . From adding 
() () () ,, 2
jk jk
BB
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=
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The LHS of equation (10) presents the net benefit when immigrant  j  links only to 
immigrants in the form of a “complete network”, whereas the RHS presents the net 
benefit from linking to the natives and the immigrants (which are connected in the 
structure of “complete network”). In a similar way, we can show that the inequality, 
which is presented in (10), is valid not only for “complete networks” but also for each 
possible structure of immigrants’ group (if this structure yields more benefit than the 
“complete network”). Anyway, from the first two immigrants’ behavior we can 
conclude that all the future immigrants will form a link only with immigrants.  
In the case where the second immigrant chooses not to link to the natives, a 
separation is obtained, i.e. two segregated groups are created: immigrants and natives. 
Figures 6.2 and 6.3 present possible formations of separation. The unique interaction 
between these groups is via the first immigrant who is used as a “bridge” between the 
two societies. The first immigrant is the single agent who incurs the connection cost 
with the host society and all future immigrants will benefit from his links. We expect 
that this occurs when the connection cost is high or when the net utility from a link 
with a native is low, relative to the cost. This would probably hold in the case where 
immigrants are temporary workers. It should be noted that by proposition 1 and 
lemma 1, if the third immigrant links only with one immigrant, all the future 
immigrants will behave like him and a “star network” will be obtained (see figure 
6.2). In this case the role of the central agent is double: he is used as a middleman 
between the immigrants’ society and the new society and at the same time is used as a 
“hub” for the immigrants’ society. The intensity of the relationship of immigrants 
with the first immigrant increases from period to period, and he becomes a more 
influential leader.  
These results are supported by extensive studies on migration networks and 
assimilation in the host country. For instance, Battu et al. (2004), using the UK 
Quarterly Labour Force Survey, shows that less assimilated ethnic unemployed 
workers (i.e., Pakistani and Bangladeshi and Indians) are more likely to utilize family 
and friendly ties to find a job than more assimilated workers. These assimilated 
workers use more formal job search methods. Lazear (1999), basing his study on U.S. 
census data, showed that when the immigrant proportion in the host country increases, 
their incentive to learn the new culture and acquire the new language decreases.   14
Locher (2004) examined immigrants from the F.S.U. to Israel and found that the more 
educated came earlier. The first immigrants are therefore more skilled, acquire the 
destination country language and manners, and assimilate in the new country. The 
next immigrants do not have the incentive to invest any effort in assimilating in the 
new society and form links only with previous immigrants. 
If the second immigrant chooses possibility (c) and forms a link with natives 
and the first immigrant, the net benefit from a direct link with the immigrant is 
positive, i.e.  ()
21 21 ,, M MM M M M Pe u e > . We can also conclude that: 
 
(11)  () () ( )





M MM M M ML MM MM M M M MM
i
Xp e u e c e p e uX e
=
=
+− − − > + − ∑  
 
The LHS presents the second immigrants’ benefit from linking to the natives, whereas 
the RHS presents his benefit from linking only to the first immigrant. The future 
immigrants will continue to form a link with the natives and the immigrants as long as 
the net benefit of interaction with natives and immigrants will be higher than the net 
benefit of interaction with only immigrants. In this scenario, integration is obtained 
and the immigrants are assimilated in the destination society but maintain a link with 
their source society. The immigrants acquire the local language and manners but keep 
their cultural identity. Figures 6.4 and 6.5 present possible formations of this case. 
The utility of immigrant  j  if all the immigrants have a link with immigrant k  
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=≠ ∑  increases as well. At some point of time, it may be 
worthwhile for the immigrant to invest only in immigrant k  in order to enjoy his links 
with both immigrants and natives. As shown above, if an immigrant chooses to 
establish a link with only one immigrant, all future immigrants will follow him and a 
“star network” will be obtained (see figure 6.6). Regarding the previous immigrants   15
who already invested the fixed cost, c, they continue to have a link with all the 
natives but a link with only one immigrant (immigrant k ). 
These results are supported by Kahanec (2006) who shows that the 
disadvantage, of members in minority groups in earnings, increases in size relative to 
the minority in a region. In our model, we can see that in cases where the number of 
members in the minority groups is low, the members are assimilated in the new 
society.  However increasing the number of members in the minority groups can 
cause separation (and as a result, a decrease in wages, (see Chiswick, 1978)).  
We summarize the results in the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 3: 
When the first immigrant chooses to establish a link with the natives: 
•  If the second immigrant also establishes a link with them, but not with the 
immigrant, we obtain “assimilation”, i.e. all the following immigrants will form a link 
only with the natives. 
•  If the second immigrant establishes a link only with the first immigrant, we obtain 
“separation” (or “segregation”), i.e. all the following immigrants will form a link 
only with the immigrants. 
•  If the second immigrant establishes a link with the natives and the first immigrant, 
we may obtain “integration”, i.e. all the next immigrants also link to the natives and 
to the immigrants. However it is possible to move to “separation” (or "segregation").   
 
We assumed that  MLL M uu > , thus the immigrant bears the linking cost. However, if all 
the interactions between the natives and the immigrants are done by a “middleman”, 
as the number of members in the immigrant group increases, the utility of the natives 
via the indirect links with immigrants increases and we can conclude that: 
 
Proposition 4: 
In the case where only one immigrant forms a link with the natives, when the 
immigrants stock increases, the natives may maintain the connection and bear the 
cost (instead of the immigrant).  
Moreover, if the structure of the immigrants is a “star network”, fewer immigrants 
are required to bear the linking cost from the immigrant to the natives.       16
 
Proof: Appendix 4. 
 
It should be noted that because of the investment of the natives in the immigrant, the 
middlemen”, increase as the number of the immigrants in the host country increase 
(see proposition 1).  


























== ∀ ≥ ∑∑ , it is clear that the net benefit of the 
second immigrant from the interaction with natives is also negative, thus he faces only 
two possibilities: either to form a link with the first immigrant or not at all. If the 
second immigrant chooses the first possibility then: 
 
(14)  ( )
22 1 2 1 ,, 0 MM M M M M M BP e ue =− >  
 
As shown above, if the net utility from a link is positive then 
2 2
j MM B Bj >∀ > . From 
the second immigrant’s choice, we can conclude that all the following immigrants 
will form a link at least with one immigrant. The benefits to the immigrants increase 
as the number of the immigrants increases.  A separation is obtained but, contrary to 
the previous case, there is no immigrant used as a “bridge” between the two societies. 
This result could suggest an application for public policy: the government may adopt 
a policy which decreases the assimilation cost of at least the first immigrants. It will 
enable interactions between the immigrants and the natives. 
              Finally, if the second immigrant chooses not to form a link with the first 
immigrant then:  
 
(15)  ( )
22 1 2 1 ,, 0 MM M M M M M BP e ue =− <  
   17
It is clear that equation (15) is valid for all the following immigrants, thus 
marginalization is obtained. The immigrants have no (or almost no) interaction with 
the destination country and the source country. The network formation of the 
immigrants is an empty network. It should be noted that according to Berry (1997), 
people rarely choose such an option. Thus,  
 
Proposition 5: 
When the first immigrant chooses not to establish a link with the natives: 
•  If the second immigrant establishes a link only with the first immigrant, we obtain 
“separation” (or “segregation”), i.e. all the following immigrants will form a link 
only with immigrants. 
•  If the second immigrant chooses also not to establish a link with the immigrants, 
we obtain “marginalization”, i.e. there is no interaction between the immigrants.  
 
4. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we analyzed the formation of social networks when the investment in 
the link is endogenous, i.e. the players choose how much effort to invest in each 
relationship. Following the pioneering study by Bala and Goyal (2000a) we consider a 
non-cooperative model of network formation where the cost of link formation is 
incurred only by the agent who initiates the link. We focus on the intensity of the link 
in different structures. The paper contributes to the emerging literature which 
proposes a different approach to the endogenous link strength (see, for example, 
Brueckner, 2006 and Bloch and Dutta, 2008), however in contrast to this literature, 
we do not consider an arbitrary number of agents. 
Network and social ties play a significant role in the assimilation process (see, 
for instance, Massey, 1987; Chiswick, 1996; Carrington, 1996; Borjas, 2000 and 
Bauer et al., 2007). Furthermore, the immigration formation is compatible with the 
theoretical model: a sequence of homogenous individuals join the country and must 
decide with whom to form a link. We therefore choose to apply this model to 
immigration using Berry’s (1997) approach. We found that if the two first immigrants 
form a link with natives but not with each other, assimilation will be achieved. If the 
first immigrant forms a link with the natives and the second immigrant establishes a 
link only with the first immigrant, then “separation” will be obtained. The first   18
immigrant will be used as a mediator between the host society and the migrants' 
society. Finally, if the two first immigrants form a link with natives and each other, 
then “integration” will occur, but moving to “separation” will be possible. The paper 
supplies evidence from the empirical literature to support these theoretical results. 
Our results show that network formations are affected by the first immigrants’ 
behavior which stems from their skills and the social distance between the two 
societies. Public policy can affect the network formation by the allocation of 
resources for the assimilation of the first immigrants. Finally, we conclude that if the 
minority’s size is too large, the immigrant, who connects between the immigrants and 
the natives, will cease to bear the connection cost and the natives will bear this cost 
instead.  This result is interesting because the natives benefit less than the immigrants 
from the relationship. It should be noted that our model is written as a portrayal of 
immigrants and natives, but it may be applied in various situations with links across 
different groups. 
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Figure 1. The probability of being friends 
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Figure 4. A “star network” 
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Appendix 1 
In the next period,  1 N +  agents are members in the group, the utility of individual i 
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i p e is a concave function. Thus while the slope decreases, the effort increases.  
 
Appendix 2 
Denote the optimal effort of agent i where he benefits from one direct link (which 
was presented at equation (1)) by  c e  and  his effort if he joins the “star network” by 
s
i e . Individual 3 faces two options: the first, to invest in the friendship with one 
individual (number 1 or 2) and to benefit from an indirect link with another; the 
second, to invest in both individuals and to benefit from two direct links. If individual 
3 decides to invest in only one agent then  ( ) ( ) 33 3
s c B eB e > , hence: 
 
(18)  () ( ) 33 () () 2 ()
s cs c c p e u pe u e pe u e +− > −  
 
Rearranging equation (18) gives us: 
 
(19)  ( ) ( ) 33 3 ()() () () ()
s cc c c c s s p e pe u pe u e pe u e pe u e >− + − − −    28
 
c e is the value of e which maximizes  3() ()
cc c B ep e u e = − , thus it is clear that: 
 
(20)  33 () ()
cc ss p eue p eue − >−  
 
Hence, from equation (19) and (20), it follows that: 
 
(21)  3 ()() ()
s cc c p ep eu p eue >−  
 
It is assumed that  1 n−  agents are connected in the form of “star network”,  1
s
n e −  
denotes the intensity of their link with the central agent. Let us prove that individual 
n also connects only to the central agents. Individual n faces a number of options: 
(a) to form a link with the central agent; (b) to form a link with all the  1 n−  
individuals; (c) to form a link with the central agent and with additional 
(0 2) kk n ≤≤−agents, and (d) to form a link with (0 2) kk n ≤ ≤−  agents without the 
central agent.  
        From multiplying equation (21) by ( 3) 3 ni − ∀>  and adding it to equation (18), 
the following result is obtained: 
 
(22)  () () ( )( ) 33 () 2 () 1 ()
s cs c c p eun p e ue n p e u e +− −>− −  
 
s
n e  is the optimal effort of individual n in the structure of “star network”, thus 
() () 33
s s
nn B eB e > . If equation (22) is true then: 
 
(23)  () () ( )( ) 1 () 2 ( ) 1 ()
s ss c c
nn n p eun p eue n p e u e − +− −>− −  
 
Thus this means that the benefit of individual n from possibility (a) is higher than the 
benefit from possibility (b). Now we prove that possibility (a) is better than possibility 
(c), in order to do it we show that: 
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(24)
() () ( ) ( )( ) 1, 1 1 , 1 () 2 ( ) ( ) 2 ( ) ()
s ss s c c
nn n n n n p eun p eue p e un k p eue k p e u e −− +− −> +− − − + −
 
It is known that 
s
n e  is a maximum value of the function level thus:  
(25)  () () ( ) ( ) 1, 1 1 , 1 () 2 ( ) ( ) 2 ( )
ss s s
nn n n n n p e u np e u e p e u np e u e −− + −− > + −−  
 
Therefore it is sufficient to proof that: 
 
(26)
() ()( ) ( )( ) ,1 1 ,1 ,1 1 ,1 () 2() () 2 () ( )
s sc c
nn n n n n p eu n p e u e p eu n k p e u ek p e u e −− +− − > +− − − + −
 
Or, equally: 
(27)  1, 1 () () ( )
s cc
nn p ep e u p e u e − >−  
 
By equation (21) and the fact that  13 () ( )
s s
n p ep e − >  and  ,1 () ( )
c
n p ep e > , equation (27) 
must be true.   
Finally, in order to prove that possibility (a) is better than possibility (d) we 
show that: 
(28) 
( ) ( )
() () () () ()
1
,1 1 1 ,
() 2 ( )
() 3 () () 1( )
ss s
nn n
s ss c c
ni n n n ni
pe u n pe u e




++ − − − + − −
 
 
for  1 i ≠ . 
Equation (25) is satisfied, thus in order to prove that equation (28) holds it is 
sufficient to proof that: 
(29) 
( ) ()
() () () () ()
,1 1 ,1
,1 1 1 ,
() 2 ()
() 3 () () 1( )
s
nn n
s ss c c
ni n n n ni
pe u n k pe u e
p eu p e u n k p ep e u e k p e u e
−
−− −
+− − − >
++ − − − + − −
 
 
It is known that ,1 n e  is a maximum value of the function, thus it is sufficient to proof 
that:   30
(30) 
( ) ()
() () () () ()
,1 ,
,1 1 1 ,
() 2 ( )
() 3 () () 1( )
s
ni n ni
s ss c c
ni n n n ni
pe u n k pe u e
p eu p e u n k p ep e u e k p e u e
−
−− −
+− − − >
++ − − − + − −
 
 
By algebraic manipulation we obtain: 
(31)  1 () 1
s
n pe− <  
 
Equation (31) is satisfied as assumed above.   
  
Appendix 3 
Individual 3 faces two options: first, to invest in the friendship with one individual 
and to benefit from an indirect link with another individual, second, to invest in both 
individuals and to benefit from two direct links. As presented at lemma 1, if 
individual 3 chooses the first possibly, all future immigrants will follow him and a 
“star network” will be obtained. Let us now examine the case of a “complete 
network”. If the third individual decides to invest in both agents then 
() () 33 3
cs B eB e > , i.e.: 
(32)  () ( ) 33 2( ) ( ) ( )
cc s c s p eue p e u p eu e − >+−  
() 33
s B e  is a maximum point, so it is clear that: 
(33)  () ( ) 33 () () () ()
s cs c cc p e u pe u e pe u pe u e +− >+−  
Equations (32) and (33)  together give us: 
(34)  () ( ) 2( ) ( ) ( )
cc c c c p eue p e u p eu e − >+−  
Or, equally: 
( 3 5 )  () ()()
cc c c p eue p ep eu −>  
The RHS represents the net benefit from a direct link, whereas the LHS represents the 
utility from an indirect link. As long as this condition exists, each agent connects to 
all the previous agents and a “complete network” is created. Now we prove that if this   31
condition  is not satisfied for individual i then he forms a link only with one 
individual. The central agent can be each agent who is linked in the network, because 
the benefit that agent i can yield from each agent (one direct link and  2 i−  indirect 
links) is identical. 
It is given that: 
(36)  () () ()
s cc c
i p ep eu p eue >−  
We prove that the benefit from one direct link and  2 i −  indirect links is higher than 
the benefit from  1 kk ∀ > direct links and  1 ik − −  indirect links, it means that: 
(37)  () () ( ) ( )
** () 2 () () 1 ()
sc s c
ii i i p e u i p eu e p e k u i k p eu k e +− −> +−− −   
Where
*
i e  is the optimal investment if the individual forms a link with k  agents. 
s
i e  is 
the maximum point of the function, it is sufficient to prove that: 
(38)  () () ( ) ( )
** * * () 2 () () 1 ()
cc
ii i i p eui p e ue p ek ui k p e uk e +− −> +−− −  
Rearranging equation (38) gives us: 
(39)  () ( ) ( )
** * 1( ) 1 1( ) ( )
c
ii i kp eu ke kp ep eu −− − > −  
Since 10 k −<, thus: 
(40) 
** * ()() ()
c
ii i p ep eu p eue >−  
By equation (36) and the facts that 
** * ,() ()
sc c
ii i i e e pe u e pe u e >− > − , equation (40)
must be true.  
As shown at proposition 1 
**
1 ii ee + > . Thus if equation (40) is valid for 
individual i, it will be valid for individual  1 i+ . All the future agents will form a link 
only with the central agent and moving from a “complete network” to a “star 
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Appendix 4 
Denote the number of the immigrant group members by M . The utility which native 
j  obtains from the relationship with immigrant k  if the immigrant bears the cost of 
link is: 
(41)  () () ,,
1,
kk j i k
iM
MM L L M M M L M
ii k





⎝⎠ ∑  
The benefit of immigrant k  from relationship with native  j  is constant, whereas the 
utility of the native from this relationship increases during the time. As the stock of 
immigrants,  M , increases, the natives benefit from more indirect links with the 
immigrants. Denote the new number of the immigrants in the host country by 
'' M MM ∀>. Hence, it is possible that: 
(42)
  () () () ()
'
,, , , ,
1, 1,
jk ik jk k j ik
iM iM
L M LM M M LM L M M L LM M M LM
ii k ii k




+− > + ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ∑∑  
 
Furthermore, if the immigrants are linked by a “star network”, the optimal effort 
which the immigrants invest in the central agent,  , ik M M e , also increases with the 
increase in the number of immigrants. The benefit to the native from the relationship 
with the immigrant, who is the central agent, increases more than if the immigrants 
are linked in a different structure. Thus fewer immigrants are required in order that 
equation (42)  will be satisfied.       